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1 Introduction
The dynamics of executive labour market has been studied to great details in recent times.
These studies provide stylized facts about the pay and incentives of Chief Executive O¢ cers
(CEO) and the board of directors. However, most of these stylized facts are based on
the so-called Anglo-American structures of US (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 Gabaix
and Landier, 2008; Kaplan and Minton, 2012) and the UK (Murphy, 1999; Girma et al.
2008; Conyon et al. 2013). In the Anglo-American structure of capital market, investors
are specialized outside entities, equity ownership is dispersed, and CEOs does not have
substantial ownership rights. To what extent the stylized facts of corporate governance
apply if these conditions are relaxed is under represented in the literature. A few empirical
evidence exists for the governance structures in Japan (Berglöf and Perotti, 1994; Kang and
Shivdasani, 1995; Classens, et al. 2002) and more recently for China (Conyon and He, 2013;
Bryson et al. 2014). China and Japan is particularly interesting because of the role of the
State and nancial institutions in corporate governance and the concentrated shareholding.
There is very little evidence on how a rms ownership structure impacts upon corpo-
rate governance. A popular view is that concentrated shareholding, often by the founding
family, is associated with poor corporate governance (Classens, et al. 2002; Gibson, 2003;
Roe, 1993). They argue that concentrated shareholding entrench managers and leads to
expropriation of minority shareholders. Kaplan (1994, 1997) nds no signicant di¤erence
in corporate governance outcomes between US, Germany and Japan-countries that vary
widely in corporate ownership structure. However, these countries also have vastly di¤erent
capital market structure, and legal and institutional frameworks. For example, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) nd that in countries with ine¢ cient legal
protection of shareholdersrights, concentrated shareholding is more prevalent. Therefore,
such cross-country comparisons provide limited evidence on the impact of ownership struc-
ture on governance outcomes. Further, Shleifer and Yafeh (2007) provides evidence that
rms with concentrated ownership is not patently value-reducing as is often perceived in a
strand of corporate governance literature.
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Firms should be subject to the same institutional factors in order to provide an ideal
experimental setting to compare the e¤ect of holding structure on corporate governance and
performance. In this paper, we examine the impact of the di¤erent ownership structures on
corporate governance outcomes by employing data from Indian listed rms as India provides
a unique setting to compare di¤erent governance styles within the same institutional frame-
work and macroeconomic structure. The governance system in India is a combination of
rms with dispersed shareholding, like the US and the UK, and the insider dominated Chi-
nese and Japanese structure. About 37% of the largest Indian rms are parts of diversied
family-owned business groups, 9% are controlled by the state and about 54% are Anglo-
American style stand-alone rms with dispersed equity shareholding and outside investors.
Market and non-market institutions in India have evolved over a long period of time and are
relatively stable, allowing for results that are comparable with extant corporate governance
literature which is based predominantly on evidence from US and UK rms (Sarkar and
Sarkar, 2000).
The presence of stand-alone rms with dispersed shareholding and Korean chaebol -type1
business group a¢ liates with complex cross-holdings within the same regulatory and ac-
counting framework allows us to overcome many shortcomings of the rst generation of
cross-country comparisons of corporate governance. In doing so, we also add to the nascent
literature on the e¤ectiveness of corporate governance is in emerging economies.
We nd that business group a¢ liate rms with concentrated shareholding are, on av-
erage, bigger and more protable on some parameters than a stand-alone rm. However,
there is no signicant di¤erence between the corporate governance outcomes in business
group a¢ liates and in the standalone rms with dispersed shareholding. Both type exhibit
similarities with the stylised facts from the Anglo-American literature on corporate gover-
nance. This is contrary to the assertions that concentrated control through crossholding is
associated with e¢ ciency loss. Our results suggest that corporate governance outcomes in
1The word "chaebol" means "business family" or "monopoly" in Korean. The chaebol structure can
encompass a single large company or several groups of companies, which is owned, controlled or managed
by the same family dynasty, generally that of the groups founder. Samsung, Hyundai and LG Group are
among the biggest and most prominent examples. A key governance implication of such structures is that it
permits founding families to run nominally independent companies within a huge business group by owning
a small but controlling interest in the parent company.
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business group rms with a family-owner as the top manager are comparable to those in
stand-alone rms where the CEO has limited control, but the incentive alignment mecha-
nisms are di¤erent. Governance outcomes and mechanisms may have deep rooted cultural
norms and more than one governance mechanism can lead to similar outcomes. Our results
are consistent with the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argument that corporate ownership varies
systematically in ways that are consistent with value-maximization.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a background to Indian
corporate governance structure and relevant empirical evidence, Section 3 and 4 describes
the data and econometric methods respectively. Section 5 discusses the results and section
6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Literature Review
The institutional framework for corporate governance in India dates back to 1875 with
the setting up of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The Companies Act of 1956 was
enacted to govern the activities of listed rms in India, but the industrial and the service
sectors were dominated by public sector rms. It was di¢ cult to set up and run large-
scale private businesses due to bureaucratic licensing requirements, and the role of the stock
markets was undermined by political inuences. Due largely to the economic liberalization
of 1991, there has been a shift away from the traditional interventionist approach to a more
Anglo-American style of governance. Since then, India saw a major growth in listed private
rms, their reliance on external sources of nancing and foreign investment while the role
of government diminished. La Porta et al. (1997) counts India to have the highest level
of shareholder rights index at par with other English origin common law countries as well
as the highest level of creditor rights. Whilst the country scores highly on the measures of
investor protection due to the regulatory control of the Securities and Exchange Board of
India (SEBI), these are compromised by poor enforcement and corporate corruption.
In an attempt to improve the corporate governance regulations in India, SEBI enacted
Clause 49 of Listing Agreement in 2001 that is similar in spirit to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
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(SOX) of US. Clause 49 lays down a range of governance imperatives for listed rms, ranging
from board composition, independence of audit committee, enhanced disclosure norms and
make the CEO and the CFO personally responsible for the internal control systems. These
reforms brought India further in line with developed capital markets, and have partially
contributed to the increase in foreign investments. In contrast to the mixed impact of
SOX on the US corporate governance, Clause 49 is reported to have a positive impact
on the governance and stock market performance (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Chakraborty,
Megginson and Yadav, 2007).
However, dispersed shareholding pattern, as is common in U.S. and U.K. are not widely
prevalent in India so far. About 16% of the rms listed in BSE is wholly or signicantly
controlled by the government, federal and state, and 3 of the top 6 Indian rms in 2014
are public sector rms. On the other end of the spectrum, about a third of the listed rms
have western-style diversied shareholding and professional managers. However, diversied
business groups, mostly having a family-centric controlling stake, dominates the Indian
private sector.
A common characteristics of these business groups is the presence and inuence of pro-
moters. The term is commonly used to mean controlling stakeholder and can be an
individual or a family. These promoters, collectively hold about 54% of the shares in the
business-group rms2 . Consequently, tunneling of assets can be a potential source of in-
e¢ ciency and loss of protability. Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) nds that
business group rms are 30% more likely to su¤er earnings loss during industry shocks com-
pared to Western-style standalone rms in the same industry. Also, rms down the pyramid
are less a¤ected by shocks as their bu¤ered using the assets of the rms nearer the top of
the pyramid. This suggests that the controlling stakeholders benets in business groups at
the expense of minority shareholders. On the other hand, Khanna and Palepu (2000) nd
that a¢ liate rms of diversied business groups outperforms stand-alone rms in the same
industry.
2Firms with dispersed shareholding structure may also have CEOs and board-members who are members
of the founding family. However, their control over the rm is limited compared to business group a¢ liate
rms with more concentrated shareholding and cross-holding structure.
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Although Indian business groups share some characteristics of the pyramidal structures
in Japanese keiretsu3 , there are several key di¤erences that makes it unique. Similar to
keiretsu, individual rms within an Indian business group are legally separate entities, are
primarily responsible to its own shareholders and its accounts are audited separately. How-
ever, unlike in keiretsu where the a¢ liate rms are connected and coordinated through a
common group-specic bank, the a¢ liate rms within an Indian business groups are coordi-
nated by interlocked boards and by members of the promoterfamily, similar to the holding
structure of Korean chaebols (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). A typical Indian business group
will have dozens of rms with complex cross-holdings. The complexity of cross holdings
make it di¢ cult to compute the conventional cash-ow rights and voting rights measures.
Therefore the feasibility of studying governance mechanisms for such rms is restricted and
the focus of this paper is to study the governance outcomes.
The evidence on how corporate holding structure impacts upon corporate governance is
few and is mainly limited to cross-country comparisons. Kaplan (1997) nds that market-
basedgovernance in the US are no more e¤ective in replacing poor performing CEOs than
the relationship-orientedgovernance styles of Germany and Japan. Gibson (2003) nds
that CEO turnover is not sensitive to rm performance in emerging economy rms with
higher concentration of shareholding. Similar results are found by Roe (1993). However,
these evidences based on pooled sample of multiple countries tend to ignore the institutional
and legal frameworks which di¤er vastly across countries. Empirical evidence suggests that
institutional and legal frameworks are signicantly associated with ownership, performance
and governance (see Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; La-Porta et al. 1995). Variations in regulatory
frameworks and possible di¤erences in the nature of data collection and methodology are
among the major challenges to cross-country comparison of corporate governance practices
(Bryson et al. 2014).
Single-country studies on how corporate holding structure on corporate governance typ-
ically focus on the di¤erences between large and small rms (Black, et al. 2006) or between
3Keiretsu is a Japanese term describing a loose conglomeration of rms sharing one or more common
denominators. The companies need not necessarily own equity in each other but is organized around a
common bank. Most prominent keiretsu includes Toyota and Mitsubishi. Firms in a keiretsu can have
professional managers, and outside and institutional shareholding.
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foreign-holdings and domestic holdings (Patibandla, 2006). Stylized results from this branch
of studies is that larger rms and rms with higher foreign institutional holdings are better
governed.
Similarly, empirical evidence on corporate governance in emerging economies is very few
and is mainly focused on tunneling of assets by the controlling stakeholders at the expense
of the minority shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000; Bertrand et al., 2002). A few studies
have examined corporate governance in emerging economies and fewer still have analyzed
the impact of corporate holding structure on corporate governance outcomes. Some studies
document and examine the governance structures of keiretsu and chaebol, and the impact
of rm performance and CEO turnover (Berglöf and Perotti, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani,
1995). Classens et al. (1999 and 2000) study ownership and control in east-Asian rms.
More recently, some evidence has emerged on the governance structure of Chinese rms
(Conyon, et al. 2013; Bryson et al. 2014). They seem to suggest that some of the stylized
facts of western corporate governance, is manifest in Chinese and east-Asian rms to an
extent and that managerial power plays a prominent role in managerial pay setting.
There has been a few recent studies on Indian corporate governance. These studies
primarily focus on the how large/controlling shareholders impact upon the governance of
Indian rms. Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) nds that the large shareholding patterns have
limited benets to rm valuation. Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) nds evidence
of signicant expropriation of minority shareholders in Indian business groups. A¢ liate rms
of diversied business groups in India are seen have better nancial performance compared
to stand-alone rms with diverse shareholding (Khanna and Palepu, 2000).
However, none of the above strands of literature directly address how equity holding
structure impacts upon corporate governance outcomes. We contribute to the literature
by employing a novel setting in that within the same regulatory and institutional frame-
work, we can compare the governance outcomes for business group rms with concentrated




A major challenge to comparison between corporate holding structure and governance is
that corporate holding structure is often endogenous to institutional and legal frameworks
of di¤erent countries. Also, the availability of reliable rm-level information on corporate
governance outside the United States and Europe has so far been a suspect. Our research
gathers evidence from India, where a reasonable number of comparable listed rms have
two distinct types of holding structure, and the country has a mature capital market with
publicly available reliable and audited nancial information and industry classications.
Indian accounting standards are aligned with IFRS and US GAAP and makes it easier to
verify the reliability of the information provided. Further, by 2005 all Indian listed rms
adopted the recommendations of Clause-49, a Sarbanes-Oxley type governance regulation
which enhances transparency and comparability of the data.
The data for this study is obtained from the Prowess database, maintained by the Centre
for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). The sample of rms is the top 500 listed rms
in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). Collectively, these rms represent over 95% of the
total market capitalization. The sample period is from 2006 to 2013. Although prior data
is available, the coverage of the data is better 2006 onwards. We follow rms from the time
they rst enter BSE 500 within our sample period till the end of the sample period, even if
it drops out of BSE 500 listings subsequently. Firms that are delisted, taken private or are
acquired are lost from observation.
Our nal sample is an unbalanced panel of 1008 rms with 5311 rm/year observations.
Of the 1008 rms in our sample, 369 (36.61%) are a¢ liate rms of business groups, 98
are public sector rms and 541 (53.67%) are stand-alone rms with dispersed sharehold-
ing. We adopt CMIEs classication of group a¢ liation and augment it with hand collected
information from publicly available sources.4 The a¢ liate rms of business groups are of-
ten connected through common family ownership and cross-holding between di¤erent group
4CMIEs classication is cross-referenced and augmented from the annual reports and lings of individual
rms with the Bombay Stock Exchange.
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rms. Public sector rms with signicant government involvement and political appoint-
ments lends itself poorly to such comparisons and are hence excluded from our analysis.5
Throughout this text, the top executive of the rm is identied as the CEO. However,
Managing Directorand Chief Executive O¢ cerare interchangeably used as job titles for
the top executive. Prowess allows identication of the top executive of each rm throughout
the sample period but doesnt provide information on CEO characteristics like tenure, age,
and whether the CEO is a member of the founding family. These information are carefully
hand collected from various lings (annual reports, statutory lings with the stock exchange,
etc.) of each individual rm over the sample period and press-reports. We also dont know
if the CEOs departure is forced or voluntary. The association between forced turnover and
rm performance is a better measure of corporate governance. However, classication of
CEO turnover as forced or otherwise is an inexact science and often relies on press report-
based algorithms (Homroy, 2014; Peters and Wagner, 2014). Further, CEO dismissals are
often cloaked in euphemisms and hence such classications may not reect the true cause
of turnover. The cost of gathering and disentangling this information is costly in the Indian
context. In this study we cannot di¤erentiate between forced and voluntary turnover.
Executive compensation in India is structured in two main components- xed salary and
performance based pay. The performance based component, unlike the equity based pay
prevalent in the western economies, is generally paid out in cash bonus and perquisites.
Bonus commissions form about 28% of total CEO pay. The structure of the pay is similar
across rms with both types of share-holding patterns.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics on Corporate Governance outcomes, rm character-
istics and board characteristics. Panel A presents summary statistics for the full sample for
the period 2006-2013 whereas Panels B,C, and D provides summary statistics for business
groups, private stand-alone rms and public sector rms. Sales is reported in million US$
5For example, CEOs or Managing Directors of public sector rms are xed term bureaucratic appoint-
ments and the pay is contingent on tenure and rank, rather than rm performance.
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and CEO pay variables are reported in 000 US$.
3.2.1 Ownership Measures
In this paper we compare rms with two di¤erent corporate holding structures- rms with
concentrated shareholding (Business Group A­ iates) and rms with dispersed shareholding
(Private Stand-Alone). We control for ownership by the percentage of equity shares held
by the promoters. As discussed above, promoters are the person/s or family who have the
controlling stake in the rm. We also control for institutional shareholding by the percentage
of equity shares held by nancial institutions like mutual funds, banks, insurance companies
and venture capital funds. From panels B and C, the mean shareholding of promoters in
business groups are 57% whereas that in private stand-alone rms is 23%. Institutions like
banks and insurance rms hold about 20% shares in business group a¢ liate rms and 16%
in private stand-alone rms. These gures suggest that business group a¢ liates are more
closely held than private stand-alone rms and the degree of control of the promoter-family
is much more.
3.2.2 Firm Performance Measures
We measure rm performance using a range of indicators. We control for the size of the
rm using natural log of sales. Performance is measured by return on assets and rms long
term prospect is measured by Tobins-Q, approximated here by market-to book value. We
use annualized measures of rm size and performance. The nancial indicators are absolute
performance of individual rms.
Further, we control for industry-adjusted performance to control for industry-specic
heterogeneity. This was done at 2-digit SIC level. The rms in our sample belong to 21
distinct 2-digit SIC code. Table 1 provides sample statistics of rm performance measures
for di¤erent types of rms. A¢ liate rms of business groups are generally bigger in size with
almost twice the annual sales of private rms with dispersed shareholding. However, the
rm performance measures, ROA and MTBV, of the business group a¢ liates and private
stand-alone rms are largely comparable.
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On average, Indian public sector rms are more than three times larger than business
group a¢ liated rms and they have lower MTBV and prot. Our preliminary analysis
of public sector rms showed very low pay-performance sensitivity in these rms. Since
these rms have very di¤erent governance structures, priorities and objectives, we drop this
category of rms in subsequent analyses.
3.2.3 Corporate Governance Variables
Board size is measured by the total number of directors on the board. The mean board
size for the full sample is 9.94, with a maximum of 33 and a minimum of 1. The boards of
standalone rms (9.28) are smaller than the boards of business group a¢ liates (10.11) on an
average. The independence of the board is traditionally measured by the percentage of non-
executive/independent directors on board. Prowess identies non-executive/independent
directors. Where that was not the case, we manually identied the independent directors
from the annual reports and nd that the mean proportion of independent directors on the
board of both types of rm are comparable (51% on an average). This is not surprising as
Clause 49 stipulates that at least half of the board of directors must full the criteria for
independent directors if the chairperson is an executive director.
The traditional measure of board independence may not be su¢ cient in this context. In
business group a¢ liates, large shareholding may lead to greater presence of Promoters on
the board. Therefore, we identify the Promoters who hold the CEO position, and whether
the CEO and Chairman positions are held by the same individual. Further, promoters hold
the CEO position in 44% of business group a¢ liate rms. The same for private stand-alone
rms is 13%.
4 Empirical Strategy
To examine and compare corporate governancemechanisms of rms are tricky. The presence
of chaebol-type business groups with complex cross-holdings make it di¢ cult to disentangle
cash-ow and voting rights. Further, even though Indian corporate governance laws and
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capital market structures are well developed in nominal terms, the enforcement may not
always be automatic (Bertrand et al. 2002). Therefore, we study the corporate governance
outcomes in an attempt to examine the performance of corporate governance across the two
di¤erent ownership types. The outcomes we study are the pay-performance sensitivity and
the relationship between CEO turnover and rm performance. This is consistent with the
approach of Bryson et al (2014) and Gibson (2003) for studying corporate governance of
emerging economies.
First, we examine the impact of di¤erent ownership structures on the governance out-
comes in business group a¢ liates, and private stand-alone rms. The outcomes in themselves
are not su¢ cient conditions to infer about the degree to which the governance mechanism
is e¤ective. However, these outcomes forms the necessary conditions for e¤ective corporate
governance and hence can be used as reliable basis of comparison.
To examine the rst governance outcome, i.e. the performance sensitivity of CEO pay
for Indian listed rms, we estimate the following model:
CEOPay = f(FirmPerformance; F irmSize; CEOcharacteristics;BoardCharacteristics)
(1)
We test whether there is a positive and signicant association between CEO pay and
rm performance.
CEOPay = f(FirmPerformance+ Zit) (2)
Where rm performance is measured by return on assets (ROA) and Market to Book
Value (MTBV),  captures the e¤ect of rm performance on CEO pay and Zit is a vector of
all control variables. We use di¤erent measures of rm performance to test the performance
sensitivities of the corporate governance outcomes. This is particularly interesting since
equity-linked pay forms a very small proportion of pay for Indian CEOs.
Further we examine if the performance sensitivity of a¢ liate rms of business groups are
di¤erent from the stand-alone rms with dispersed shareholding. To do this we include an in-
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dicator variableBu sin essoupAffiliate and an interaction variable ofBu sin essoupAffiliate
ROA. The coe¢ cient of the interaction variable captures the performance sensitivity of CEO
pay in business group a¢ liate rms compared to the control group of stand-alone rms. We
then analyse the baseline model separately for business group a¢ liates and stand-alone rms
to identify if the pay-performance sensitivity varies if the CEO is the controlling shareholder
or a member of the promoter family.
Next, we examine whether poor performing CEOs are more likely to be replaced in
Indian rms. To test that we estimate the following
Probability(Turnover) = f(FirmPerformance+ Zit) (3)
f(:) is a logit function and as discussed earlier, rm performance is measured in terms
of ROA and MTBV, and Zit is a vector of other control variables. We follow a similar
empirical strategy as equation (1) to examine whether poor performing CEOs of business
groups are less likely to be replaced and include indicators for group a¢ liates and interaction
of group a¢ liate and rm performance, and subsequently use subsamples to test how the
relationship di¤er if the the CEO is a member of the promoter family.Together, these two
governance outcomes can indicate the nature of corporate governance in rms with di¤erent
shareholding patterns.
Finally, we examine if a rms ownership structure impacts upon the performance and
the valuation of the rm. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) nds that the ownership structure of
the rm doesnt signicantly impacts upon the performance. To test this, we estimate the
following equation:
FirmPerformace = f(OwnershipType+ Xit) (4)
Where ownership type indicates whether an individual rm has dispersed shareholding
or is a business group a¢ liate andXit is a vector of all rm-level and board-level observables.
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5 Results and Analysis
5.1 Corporate Holding Structure and Pay-Performance Sensitivity
To examine if di¤erent ownership structures are associated with di¤erent corporate gover-
nance outcomes, we rst examine the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO pay. A priori, a
rm with better governance will enforce higher performance sensitivity in paying the CEO.
In Table 2, we present the results of the performance-pay regressions for the full sample. In
column (1), we report the results with only the controls for rm performance and an indi-
cator for business group a¢ liates. In columns (2)-(5), we progressively add the ownership
measures and other rm level controls and their interactions to specication (1).
The key variable of interest is the Business Group indicator. This indicator is pos-
itive and statistically signicant in column (1), suggesting that CEOs of business group
a¢ liates are paid more compared to their counterparts in rms with dispersed sharehold-
ing. With the addition of other co-variates, the estimate of the Business Group indicator
weakens in magnitude but remains statistically signicant. Further, we add an interaction
ROA  BusinessGroup in column (4) to examine if the performance of business group af-
liates have di¤erent impact on CEO pay. We nd no evidence that the pay-performance
sensitivity of CEOs in business group a¢ liates are di¤erent from that of CEOs of stand-
alone rms. Finally, in column (5), we add an indicator ROA  Pr omoterCEO to examine
if the performance of rms with a family-CEO at the helm have di¤erent impact on CEO
pay-performance sensetivity. There is no evidence to suggest that Promoter-CEOs have
lower pay-performance sensitivity.
Therefore, it seems that the raw di¤erences in CEO pay and pay-performance sensitivity
between business group a¢ liates and rms with dispersed shareholding stems from the di¤er-
ence in ownership structure. In a professionally managed rm with dispersed shareholding,
the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO is designed for attenuating the agency problem.
However, a business group-CEO can internalize the performance sensitivity through her
stake in the rm.
We investigate the source of the higher average pay in business group rms. In Table 3,
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we present the results by subsample of business group a¢ liate rms and futher stratifying in
columns (2) and (3) by rms with and without a promoter family CEO at the helm. Column
(4) reports the results for the subsample of privately held standalone rms with dispersed
shareholding. The results suggest that CEO pay is generally sensitive to rm performance,
and it is worth noting that the sensitivity is particularly strong for accounting performance
than MTBV. This is perhaps driven by the fact that the pay for Indian CEOs is structured
such that the performance-based bonus is contingent on the accounting performance of the
rm. From columns (1) and (4), the performance sensitivity of CEO pay in stand-alone rms
and business group a¢ liates are comparable. We nd no-evidence that promoter-CEOs are
paid more in business group rms. Similarly, there is no evidence that Promoter-CEOs in
business group a¢ liates with concentrated shareholding are paid more. Thus there doesnt
seem to exist any statistical di¤erence in performance sensitivity of CEO pay in rms with
di¤erent ownership structures. From tables (2) and (3) we can conclude that promoter CEOs
in business group rms is paid higher, but also have higher pay-performance sensitivity.
In Table 4, we present results of performance sensitivity of pay for di¤erent quartiles of
rm performance. The results are similar to our baseline estimates, and there is no evidence
of non-linearity or extreme values driving the baseline results. In Table 5, we present results
with industry-adjusted measures of rm performance. Firm ROA is benchmarked with the
median ROA of the same 2-digit industry group for that given year. Once again, the results
are qualitatively similar to our baseline results.
5.2 Corporate Holding and CEO Turnover
We examine if there is any di¤erence in performance sensitivity of CEO turnover in rms
with di¤erent ownership structure, using variants of specications summarised in equation
(3). In Table 6 column (1), we present the results of the logit regressions for the full
sample, and in columns (2) and (5) we present the results for business-group a¢ liates and
private stand-alone rms separately. In these three specications, the coe¢ cients on rm
performance measure (ROA) is negative and signicant at the 5% level. This suggests that
CEOs turnover is generally sensitive to rm performance for both the ownership structures.
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Further, the di¤erence between the point estimates of ROA in specications (2) and (5) is
not statistically signicant. Another common attribute between the two holding structures
is that promoter-CEOs are less likely to be red compared to their professionally hired
counterparts.
We break down the subsample of business group rms further into rms that have CEO
from the promoter family and those that have an outside CEO in columns (3) and (4), and
nd that promoter family CEOs are not likely to be dismissed for poor performance. This
is in contrast to the results in table (3) where we nd that promoter CEOs in business
group rms have higher pay-performance sensitivity. This implies the family member CEOs
are mainly incentivized through higher pay for better performance (carrot-type incentives)
while outside CEOs in business group rms are subject to a combination of both the carrot
and the stick type incentives. This can be attributed to the fact that the promoter-CEOs
internalize the consequences of poor rm performance.
In Table 7, we present results for di¤erent quartiles of rm performance and it shows
that CEO turnover is more likely in the lower quartile of the performance distribution.
Promoter CEOs are less likely to be red irrespective of the holding structure. From the
insignicance of the interaction BusinessGroups  ROA in column (1), we can conclude
that performce sensitivity of turnover in business group a¢ liates is statistically from that
of private stand-alone rms.
In Table 8, we present the results with industry-adjusted performance. The coe¢ cient
on industry-adjusted ROA is negative and signicant across the three specications and the
result that CEO turnover in business groups does not have signicantly di¤erent perfor-
mance sensitivity from that of private stand-alone rms. It should be noted that industry
adjusted ROA is more strongly associated with CEO turnover than MTBV. This is not
surprising given that stock market performance in emerging economies are noisier signals of
performance (Demigüç-Kunt and Levine, 1995).
Increase in proportions of independent directors and institutional shareholders increase
the likelihood of CEO turnover across di¤erent ownership structures. More interestingly,
concentration of shareholding by promoter family does not seem to reduce the probability of
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CEO turnover for poor performance. In addition to the results of previous sub-section, this
result suggests that concentration of shareholding doesnt lead to higher pay, this results
suggests that concentrated equity holding of promoter family in business group a¢ liates
serves more as a mechanism of incentive alignment than rent extraction.
In summary, our results suggest that the corporate governance outcomes are very similar
in rms of the two di¤erent holding structures, and there is no evidence that concentrated
equity ownership has worse outcomes than dispersed ownership.
5.3 Corporate Holding Structure and Firm Performance
As a nal step of our analysis, we analyse the performance metrics of rms to test whether
the di¤erent governance mechanisms lead to comparable performance among rms with
di¤erent type of holding structures. The underlying hypothesis is based on the Demsetz
and Lehn (1985) argument that the ownership structure of rms and rm performance are
endogenously determined and we should not be able to establish a causal connection between
them. We estimate the determinants of performance for business group rms and rms with
dispersed shareholding. In columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 9 we present the results for the
full sample with three di¤erent measures of rm performance and an indicator for business
group rms.
In the three specications, the dependent variables are ROA, Tobins-Q (approximated
by the market-to-book ratio), and EPS, respectively. The central variable of interest is the
BusinessGroup indicator. If the performance of business group rms are di¤erent from
that of privately held rms with dispersed holding structure, we will expect a statistically
signicant coe¢ cient on the BusinessGroup indicator. However, the indicator is statisti-
cally insignicant at all conventional levels for all the three measures of rm performance.
These results suggest that business group rms does not underperform but rms where
CEOs have concentrated share ownership display a negative association with performance,
as is suggested by the negative coe¢ cient on the indicator for promoter-CEOs. Using most
recent data with clear di¤erences in shareholding patterns, we have been able to validate
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the original Demsetz and Lehn (1985) results6 .
That the corporate holding structure is expected to have an e¤ect on rm performance
is perhaps because we expect di¤erent ownership structures to be associated with di¤erent
corporate governancemechanisms and outcomes. This paper presents evidence that di¤erent
corporate holding structures have similar corporate governance outcomes, and hence similar
rm performance.
5.4 Robustness
We test the robustness of our results using di¤erent estimation techniques and sample selec-
tion. First, following the conventional practice in nance literature, we exclude all rms in
the banking and nancial services industry. A large proportion of rms in the banking and
nancial services industry are in the public sector and have been excluded to begin with.
The results with the reduced sample are qualitatively similar but less precise than our base-
line estimates. Second, we use panel regressions with rm-xed e¤ects. In doing so, we had
to exclude all time invariable dummies (e.g. Promoter CEO) from our estimates. The key
results persist with similar degree of signicance. Finally, to test for performance sensitivity
of CEO pay for the range of rm performance, we use splines with three equally spaced
knots across the performance distribution for each year. The results rms within the 34th-
67th percentile have the highest performance sensitivity of CEO pay and CEO turnover.
Beyond the 67th percentile, there is no increase in performance sensitivity of governance
outcomes. This is perhaps driven by the fact that the performance-sensitive component of
CEO pay in Indian rms is in the form of cash bonus, which is not a monotonic function of
performance.7
6To check the robustness of our results, we use the formula used by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) to cal-
culate ownereship concentration. The results suggest no signicant impact of ownership structure on rm
performance.
7A general practice in Indian rms is to have performance bonus as a stair-step function of rm perfor-
mance. A stylised form would be to award no bonus for attaining up to 90% of the target, bonus=x for




In this paper we use data from large Indian rms to test if corporate governance outcomes
vary with ownership type. In contrast to the hypothesis that stand-alone rms with Anglo-
American style of governance mechanism are more e¢ cient in ensuring better corporate
governance than rms with concentrated shareholding through crossholding by inuential
families, we nd that corporate governance outcomes are similar in rms with dispersed
shareholding and business group a¢ liate rms. Indian corporate sector provide us with an
ideal setting to improve upon the rst attempts to compare the relation between corporate
holding structure and governance using cross-country data. We nd that CEOs with con-
trolling ownership gets a higher pay than outside CEOs irrespective of the holding structure
and CEOs who are members of the controlling family in business group rms are incen-
tivised by a higher performance sensitivity of pay. The CEO turnover analysis provides
a contrasting picture as we nd CEOs from promoter family are less likely to be red for
bad performance. There is indication that the power of the incumbent in business group
a¢ liated rms inuence the way in which incentives are designed but reputational considera-
tions and ownership helps to align the interests. Our results are aligned to the hypotheses of
Khanna and Yafeh (2007), who suggests that business group a¢ liate rms are not patently
value-reducing as is commonly perceived in the corporate governance literature.
Finally we nd that the moderately di¤erent governance mechanisms in the business
group rms does not reduce the performance and can even have a positive e¤ect of a rms
perceived long term prospects. Our results extends the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argument
that corporate ownership varies in ways that are consistent with value-maximization, in
providing evidence that the corporate governance outcomes are very similar in rms with
di¤erent ownership structures even though the governance mechanism may be quite di¤er-
ent. In that sense, these results suggest a mechanistic intermediate for the endogeneity in
corporate holding structure and rm performance.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
Panel A: Full Sample
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA 5303 0.083147 0.111003 -0.84722 1.826514
Sales 5311 657.1477 2756.181 0 68215.14
MTBV 5094 141.9981 291.6497 0.187351 13524.21
Board Size 5311 9.948786 3.327964 1 33
% Outside Directors 5311 50.79997 16.18122 0 100
Salary 4448 212196.2 377119.5 0.14 1.48E+07
Bonus 1991 438199.3 983469.3 -844.88 1.75E+07
Total Pay 5251 403855 898856.7 0 1.78E+07
Variable Pay 4448 257026.4 806806.2 0 1.75E+07
CEO Turnover 5311 0.14517 0.352306 0 1
%Institutional Shareholding 5311 17.80631 14.49618 0 88.19
Promoter CEO 5311 0.374882 0.484138 0 1
Panel B: Indian Business Groups
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA 1891 0.083999 0.109348 -0.81051 1.826514
Sales 1893 657.0146 2007.595 0 68215.14
MTBV 1818 149.863 362.8397 3.308825 13524.21
Board Size 1893 10.10618 3.201947 1 31
% Outside Directors 1893 51.88533 13.47592 0 100
Salary 1637 271412.3 410443.2 2225.98 6285991
Bonus 911 537033.9 1198422 578.14 1.75E+07
Total Pay 1874 584152.9 1171081 0 1.78E+07
Variable Pay 1637 378757.9 1047291 0 1.75E+07
CEO Turnover 1893 0.123613 0.329227 0 1
% Institutional Shareholding 1893 19.5519 14.31978 0 87.67
Promoter CEO 1893 0.436873 0.49613 0 1
Panel C: Private Stand-Alone
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA 2794 0.08515 0.113931 -0.84722 0.659979
Sales 2800 381.1288 2254.533 0 67522.21
MTBV 2688 147.8645 251.9192 0.187351 4972.933
Board Size 2800 9.268571 3.005059 2 33
% Outside Directors 2800 51.50873 15.63403 0 100
Salary 2363 200654.3 377337 0.14 1.48E+07
Bonus 932 400703.2 791173.2 -844.88 1.06E+07
Total Pay 2776 354613.9 741357.8 0 1.73E+07
Variable Pay 2363 214602.2 665040.6 0 1.70E+07
CEO Turnover 2800 0.110714 0.313834 0 1
% Institutional Shareholding 2800 16.45825 14.27117 0 71.32
Promoter CEO 2800 0.4 0.489986 0 1
Panel D: Indian Public Sector
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA 618 0.071484 0.101692 -0.35949 0.736702
Sales 618 1908.126 5295.857 0 46071.67
MTBV 588 90.86356 192.3899 1.907576 2924.034
Board Size 618 12.54854 3.737116 3 27
% Outside Directors 618 44.26421 23.21643 0 94.11765
Salary 448 56697.87 90303.62 234.23 911999.8
Bonus 148 65956.63 171328.7 448.43 1081364
Total Pay 601 69104.4 146305.9 0 1391115
Variable Pay 448 35986.28 108450.5 0 1105855
CEO Turnover 618 0.367314 0.482464 0 1
% Institutional Shareholding 618 18.56709 15.41419 0 88.19
Promoter CEO 618 0.071197 0.257363 0 1
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Table 2: Performance Sensitivity of CEO Pay
The dependent variable in each regression is the natural logarithm of annual CEO Pay. Column
(1) presents the result for the full sample of BSE 500 rms for the period 2006-2013; (2) and
(3) presents the result for business group a¢ liate rms with concentrated shareholding and
private stand-alone rms with dispersed shareholding. All specications are estimated with year
and industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Log Total Pay
ROA 0.578*** 0.653*** 0.986** 0.891** 0.897***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.265) (0.254)
MTBV 0.006 0.0001 0.0008 0.0001 0.0001
(0.011) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business Group 0.703 0.662*** 0.466*** 0.516*** 0.516***
A¢ liates (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.055) (0.055)
Promoter CEO 0.392*** 0.330*** 0.332*** 0.332***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
% Shareholding- -0.007*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Promoters (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Sales 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.161***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Board Size 0.0173** 0.0175** 0.0172**
(0.0065) (0.0068) (0.0065)
% Independent Directors -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
% Shareholding- 0.018** 0.018** 0.018**





Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,143 4,143 4,143 4,143 4,143






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Non-Linearity in Pay-Performance Sensitivity of CEO Pay
The dependent variable in each regression is the natural logarithm of annual CEO Pay. Column
(1) presents the result for the full sample of BSE 500 rms for the period 2006-2013; (2) and
(3) presents the result for business group a¢ liate rms with concentrated shareholding and
private stand-alone rms with dispersed shareholding. All specications are estimated with year
and industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Full Sample Business Group A¢ liates Private Stand-Alone
Dependent Variable Log Total Pay Log Total Pay Log Total Pay
Log Sales 0.187*** 0.245*** 0.270***
(0.0201) (0.0339) (0.0274)
ROA
Lower Quartile-Median 0.328*** 0.399*** 0.321***
(0.0462) (0.0758) (0.0613)
Median-Upper Quartile 0.427*** 0.548*** 0.420***
(0.053) (0.087) (0.069)
Upper Quartile 0.531*** 0.599*** 0.510***
(0.187) (0.105) (0.116)




Board Size 0.0149** 0.00268 0.0133
(0.0073) (0.0125) (0.0104)
Promoter CEO 0.0719 0.0228 0.0283
(0.0773) (0.136) (0.0938)
% Independent Directors 0.000894 -0.000804 0.0013
(0.0013) (0.00232) (0.0017)
% Shareholding- -0.00346** -0.00538 0.00341*
Promoters (0.00166) (0.00334) (0.002)
% Shareholding- 0.0134*** 0.0151*** 0.0127***
Institutions (0.00238) (0.00395) (0.0032)
ROA* 0.823**
Business Groups (0.337)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 10.076*** 9.6024*** 10.0495***
(0.2098) (0.3173) (0.2888)
Observations 4,143 1,563 2,257
Adjusted R2 25.85 22.38 29.13
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Table 5: CEO pay and Industry-adjusted Performance
The dependent variable in each regression is the natural logarithm of annual CEO Pay. Column
(1) presents the result for the full sample of BSE 500 rms for the period 2006-2013; (2) and
(3) presents the result for business group a¢ liate rms with concentrated shareholding and
private stand-alone rms with dispersed shareholding. All specications are estimated with year
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Full Sample Business Group A¢ liates Private Stand-Alone
Dependent Variable Log Total Pay Log Total Pay Log Total Pay
Log Sales 0.200*** 0.264*** 0.279***
(0.0201) (0.034) -0.0275
Adjusted-ROA 1.021*** 0.814* 1.523***
(0.274) -0.442 -0.317
MTBV 0.0001 1.41E-05 0.00011
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Board Size 0.0151** 0.0031 0.0137
(0.0074) (0.0127) (0.0105)
Promoter CEO 0.0755 0.00462 0.0464
(0.0783) (0.138) (0.095)
% Independent Directors 0.00122 -0.0005 0.00166
(0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0017)
% Shareholding- -0.0027 -0.0043 0.00411**
Promoters (0.0017) (0.0034) (0.002)
% Shareholding- 0.0153*** 0.0182*** 0.0136***
Institutions (0.0024) (0.004) (0.0033)
ROA* 0.731**
Business Groups (0.36)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 12.27*** 10.50*** 9.650***
(0.338) (0.575) (0.439)
Observations 4,143 1,563 2,257







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Non-Linearity in Performance Sensitivity of CEO Turnover
The dependent variable in each regression is a binary indicator for CEO Turnover. Column
(1) presents the result for the full sample of BSE 500 rms for the period 2006-2013; (2) and
(3) presents the result for business group a¢ liate rms with concentrated shareholding and
private stand-alone rms with dispersed shareholding. All specications are estimated with year
and industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Full Sample Business Group A¢ liates Private Stand-Alone
CEO Turnover CEO Turnover
Dependent Variable CEO Turnover
Log Pay -0.332*** -0.485*** -0.242***
(0.0364) (0.0706) (0.0562)
Log Sales 0.019 0.0614 -0.0613
(0.0362) (0.0645) (0.0618)
ROA
Lower Quartile-Median -0.305* -0.149 -0.491**
(0.163) (0.273) (0.249)
Median-Upper Quartile -0.315* -0.316 -0.333
(0.168) (0.285) (0.248)
Upper Quartile -0.0024 -0.168 0.227
(0.18) (0.337) (0.264)




Board Size 0.0960*** 0.105*** 0.107***
(0.0155) (0.0284) (0.026)
Promoter-CEO -0.721*** -0.763** -0.660**
(0.221) (0.384) (0.306)
% Outside Directors -0.0166*** -0.0112 -0.0244***
(0.0037) (0.0073) (0.0055)
% Shareholding- 0.00368 0.00138 0.00325
Promoters (0.0032) (0.007) (0.0048)
% Shareholding- 0.0140*** 0.0176** 0.0189**
Institutions (0.0049) (0.0086) (0.008)
ROA* 0.765
Business Groups (0.665)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.2089*** 0.1856** 0.2191***
(0.0358) (0.0560) (0.0459)
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.145 0.134
Observations 4,143 1,535 2,250
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Table 8: CEO Turnover and Industry-Adjusted Performance
The dependent variable in each regression is a binary indicator for CEO Turnover. Column
(1) presents the result for the full sample of BSE 500 rms for the period 2006-2013; (2) and
(3) presents the result for business group a¢ liate rms with concentrated shareholding and
private stand-alone rms with dispersed shareholding. All specications are estimated with year
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Full Sample Business Group A¢ liates Private Stand-Alone
Dependent Variable CEO Turnover CEO Turnover CEO Turnover
Adjusted ROA -0.334*** -0.495*** -0.252***
(0.036) (0.0702) (0.0556)
Log Sales 0.0167 0.0537 -0.0575
(0.036) (0.0642) (0.0615)
Log Pay 0.29 -3.099 1.298
(0.649) (7.653) (0.949)




Board Size 0.0951*** 0.106*** 0.102***
(0.0155) (0.0284) (0.0259)
Promoter-CEO -0.739*** -0.719* -0.653**
(0.223) (0.383) (0.31)
% Outside Directors -0.0168*** -0.0108 -0.0249***
(0.0037) (0.0073) (0.00545)
% Shareholding- 0.00346 0.00126 0.00317
Promoter (0.00324) (0.00697) (0.0048)
% Shareholding- 0.0128*** 0.0170** 0.0179**
Institution (0.00484) (0.00848) (0.00784)
ROA* 0.733 3.332
Business Groups (0.734) (7.647)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.2042*** 0.1297** 0.2367***
(0.0361) (0.0651) (0.0494)
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.144 0.124
Observations 4,143 1,535 2,250
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Table 9: Ownership Structure and Firm Performance
The dependent variable for each specication is given below. The
results presented in this table suggest that the ownership structure
do not have a statistically signicant impact on rm performance.
All specications are estimated with year and industry dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ROA MTBV EPS
Business Group -0.00500 12.85 -0.162
A¢ liates (0.00330) (9.401) (0.250)
Log Sales 0.00811*** -9.580*** 0.160**
(0.00103) (2.956) (0.0782)
% Shareholding- 0.000445*** 2.284*** -0.0177***
Promoters (7.86e-05) (0.264) (0.00594)
% Shareholding- 0.000742*** 1.695*** -0.0184**
Institutions (0.000122) (0.374) (0.00920)
Board Size 0.000112 -2.408* 0.0332
(0.000512) (1.455) (0.0387)
Promoter CEO -0.0186*** -20.05** -0.310
(0.00320) (9.062) (0.242)
Promoter CEO* 0.0098 32.72* 0.5008
Business Group (0.0067) (18.52) (0.4890)
% Independent Directors 0.000203* 0.0762 0.0168**
(0.000109) (0.318) (0.00821)
Constant 0.0197** 96.2447** 0.2288
(0.0087) (29.049) (0.700)
Observations 4,838 4,661 4,838
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.148 0.107
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